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ception, and the writer has been unable to find any. Would it be a wise
policy to add this exception to the list of recognized exceptions? As stated
above, all recognized exceptions have a basis of necessity, and offer some
substitute for the guaranties of reliability to be found in the oath, in the
attendant liability for perjury, and in cross-examination. It will be noted
that there is no particular necessity for the exception in question. It does
not appear that there is any reason why the declarant could not be found
and brought before the court to testify to what he saw, nor does the evi-
dence derive any peculiar value from the circumstances under which the
statements were made. There is no substitute for the guaranties of reli-
ability offered by other evidence. Such a rule might lead to the most
astonishing results. It is common knowledge that the members of the
large crowd which invariably gathers around the scene of an accident are
prone to take sides and argue about the causes and discuss the question of
who was at fault. During such arguments it is common for wild state-
ments to be made, through prejudice and excitement, which have no founda-
tion in fact. They are often made by persons who did not even see the
occurrence and have no first hand information as to the facts which they
are asserting. Yet, under the doctrine of the principal case, if one of the
participants made reply he would make these reckless statements admis-
sible against him. And aside from this natural propensity of people to be
careless about their statements under such circumstances, there is the dan-
ger of intentional fabrication of evidence. There would be nothing to pre-
vent a declarant from deliberately making damaging evidence against a
person whom he disliked, and there would be no chance to bring out the
prejudice and bias upon cross-examination.
It is submitted that it would be poor policy to add to the list of recog-
nized exceptions to the hearsay rule, since such evidence is always danger-
ous, and that the one proposed in the principal case is particularly objec-
tionable. W.H.H.
HUSBAND AND WirF-Loss OF CONSORTIUM-Appellant sued appellee for
injuries inflicted upon the husband of appellant by an agent of appellee.
Appellee operated a garage in the city of Indianapolis, storing automobiles
for owners and users. Appellant alleged that while her husband was in
said garage, a servant of appellee ran an automobile against him, seriously
injuring him, in consequence of which appellant has lost the consort, com-
panionship, society, affection, and support of her husband. Appellee's de-
murrer to the complaint was sustained. Appellant appealed. Held, de-
murrer was properly sustained, since a wife has no cause of action for loss
of consortium of husband caused by the negligence of a third party.'
By the great weight of authority at common law and under modern
statutes the husband may recover for the loss of ,his wife's consortium
caused by a tort against the wife whether such injury was the result of
negligence or not. 2 Apparently only four states have taken a different
1 Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, Supreme Court of Indiana, May 19, 1933, 185
N. E. 860.
2Brahan v. Meridian Light & ny. Co. (1919), 121 Miss. 269, 83 So. 467;
Tommee v. Pullman Co. (1922), 207 Ala. 511, 93 So. 462; Guevin v. Manchester
Street Ry. (1916), 78 N. H. 289, 99 Atl. 298; Selleck v. City of Janesville (1899),
154 Wis. 570, 80 N. W. 944; Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Glenn (1902), 66 Ohio St.
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position. 3 However, the converse is not true. Neither at common law nor
under modern statutes, does a wife have a cause of action for loss of her
husband's consortium caused by the negligence of a third person.4 Since
a wife at common law was considered as of inferior legal status, this dis-
tinction sounds in logic, but under our present day conception of the equal-
ity of men and women what explanation exists for such a distinction?
Upon an examination of the authorities it will be noticed that the courts
have differentiated the rights of the two on four different grounds.
1. Where the husband sues for the loss of his wife's consortium, the gist
of the action is the deprivation of his wife's services, and if he fails to
show such, recovery will be denied; thus the wife should not be permitted
to maintain an action where she does not have the same right in the hus-
band.5 2. The husband by suing for his own injury recovers for the loss
of consortium to his wife and to allow the wife to recover would permit
double recovery.6 3. The injury to the wife is consequential and too re-
mote.7 4. No such right existed at common law. 8
The first contention is for the most part a modern idea, and has but a
small following.9 The few courts that sanction such a doctrine do so not
because of authority, but because of lack of authority for the converse
proposition. Yet, the very earliest authority indicates that while services
are an element, they are in no sense predominant.1O Consortium is defined
as " the right of a husband to the conjugal fellowship of his wife, to her
company, co-operation, and aid in every conjugal relation."11 Probably no
better statement of this can be found than in Guevin v. Manchester Street
Railway,12 where the husband was allowed recovery for loss of consortium
even though he could not recover for loss of services. In that case the
396, 64 N. E. 438; Omaha & R. V. Ry. Co. v. Chollette (1894), 41 Nebr. 578, 59
N. W. 921. See also note 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1042. See Harper on Torts, Sec-
tion 259.
2Marri v. Stamford St. B. Co. (1911), 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582; Bolger v.
Boston Elevated Ry. Co. (1910), 205 mass. 420, 91 N. E. 389; Blair v. Seitner
Dry Goods Co. (1915), 184 Mich. 304, 151 N. W. 724 (here the court said if the
right existed for one It should also for the other); Golden v. R. L. Greene Paper
Co. (1922), 44 R. I. 231, 116 Atl. 579.
'Feneff v. N. Y. Central & HL B. R. Co. (1909), 203 Mass. 278, 39 N. E. 436;
Bernhardt v. Perry (1919), 276 Mo. 612, 208 S. W. 462; icosciolek v. Portland By.
Light & Power Co. (1916), 81 Or. 517, 160 Pac. 132; Nash v. Mobile & 0. R. Co.
(1928), 149 Miss, 623, 116 So. 100; Cravens v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (1922), 195
Ky. 257, 242 S. W. 628; Smith V. Nicholas Bldg. Co. (1915), 93 Ohio St. 101, 112
N. E. 204; Emerson v. Taylor (1918), 133 Md. 192, 104 Atl. 538; Brown v. Kistle-
man (1912), 177 Ind. 692, 98 N. E. 631. The wife was allowed to recover in Hipp
v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. (1921), 182 N. C. 9, 103 S. E. 318. This decision
was practically overruled in Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co. (1925), 189 N. C.
120, 126 S. E. 307.
1 Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co. (1915), 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N. E. 204. See Har-
per on Torts, Section 259.
'Bernhardt v. Perry (1919), 276 Mo. 612, 208 S. W. 462.
7Kosciolek v. Portland Ry. Light Co. (1916), 81 Or. 517, 160 Pac. 132.
8 Nash v. Mobile & 0. R. Co. (1928), 149 Miss. 823, 116 So. 100.
9Golden v. B. L. Green Paper Co. (1922), 44 R. I. 231, 16 Atl. 579; Marri v.
Stamford St. B. Co. (1911), 84 Conn. 9, 78 AtI. 582.
20 Hyde v. Seyssor, Cro. Jac. 538; 3 Blackstone's Commentaries 140. See also
Pound, Interests in Domestic Relations (1915), 14 Mich. L. Rev. 177.
a1 Ballentine's Law Dictionary.
a (1916), 78 N. H. 289, 99 At. 298.
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court said: "Undoubtedly the term 'consortium' included service, but it also
included society, comfort, and the sexual rights. In no early case is there
a suggestion that any one of these is superior to any other as a basis for
legal redress." Such has been the position of most of the courts,' 3 and is
the only possible explanation for a husband's recovery in those cases in
wliich he cannot recover for the loss of her services.
The second reason seems even more illogical than the first one. It is
well settled that husband and wife have reciprocal rights to the consortium
of each other.14 The right to maintain an alienation of affection suit by
either is proof of this, since the gist of the action is the loss of consortium.1 5
It being settled that each have separate rights, how can it be said that the
husband who sues for his own personal injury may recover damages for
the invasion of a right of another? The right belongs to the wife; she is
the proper party to sue. If the wife sues for alienation of affections, she
may recover, but if the injury to the same interest is caused by the negli-
gence of a third party, her husband, and he only, can recover the damage.
The result would seem to be that consortium as a legal right of the wife
is a different kind of a right and means only a share in her husband's
earnings. As heretofore noticed, consortium is much broader than that.
We pass now to the third objection to the maintenance of the action.
It is upon this ground that the courts distinguish her right to maintain an
alienation of affections suit from this type of an action.16 If the injury
to the wife is consequential and too remote, how do the courts sustain their
holdings that the husband may recover in the same type of case? The
causation question is the same in both instances. Any ordinary person can
foresee that such physical injuries may totally disrupt the peace and com-
fort of the marital relation. In the days when the wife was more or less
a superior domestic servant, such a dogma might be supported, but today
our ideals give to the relation a somewhat higher status. Are not the
courts interpreting this question against a background of a dark past?
Furthermore, it is difficult to perceive why it should make any difference
whether the right is invaded by an intentional or negligent act. In either
case the wife's interest may be invaded to precisely the same extent. In
fact, it is possible in some instances that the injury resulting from a negli-
gent act, may be more direct than one caused by an intentional act.
The last reason given by the courts is probably the strongest of the
four. Did the wife have this right at common law? The courts say no,
and yet they admit that she had a right against alienation of affections,
but simply couldn't enforce it.17 As we have seen, the right protected in
that case is the right of consortium. Apparently what the courts mean is
2Selleck v. City of Janesville (1899), 154 Wis. 570, 80 N. W. 944; Mowry v.
Chaney (1876), 43 Iowa 609; Riley v. Lidtlse (1896), 49 Neb. 139, 68 N. W. 356;
Denver Consol. Tramway Co. v. Riley (1899), 14 Col. App. 132, 59 Pac. 476. See
also Colley, Torts (1906, 3rd ed.) pp. 471-2.14 Feneff v. N. Y. Central & H. I. R. Co. (1909), 203 Mass. 278, 89 N. E. 436.
'3Buchanan v. Foster (1897), 48 N. Y. S. 732; Reading v. Gazzam (1901),
200 Pa. St., 49 Atl. 889; McGregor v. McGregor (1909), 115 S. W. 802; Adams v.
Main (1891), 3 Ind. App. 232, 29 N. E. 792. See also Madden, Persons and Domes-
tic Relations (1931) pp. 166-7; Harper on Torts, Section 256.
- Bernhardt v. Perry (1919), 276 Mo. 612, 208 S. W. 462; Kcosclolek v. Port-
land Ry. Light & Power Co. (1916). 81 Or. 517. 160 Pac. 132.
17 Foot v. Card (1889), 58 Conn. 1, 18 Atl. 1027; Bennett v. Bennett (1889),
116 N. Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17; Betser v. Betser (1900), 186 Ill. 537, 58 N. E. 249;
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that she never had a common law right against the loss caused by the
negligence of a third person. But such a doctrine seems to be more or less
gratuitous. Since the wife was under disabilities to sue for loss of con-
sortium in any case, there is little basis for the assumption. In other
words, it is assumed that if she could have maintained any action at all,
the courts would have distinguished between a direct attack on her right
of consortium and a loss which resulted from negligence.
From the standpoint of logic, the distinction seems unsound. The
courts denying to both the cause of action are by far more logical.'S It
is hard to conceive of any public policy against such an action.D This
basic principle, however, is so firmly intrenched that if any change is to
be made it will probably be the result of legislation. It might be noticed
that in the principal case the appellant alleged that the injuries were in-
flicted wantonly and with malice. A few recent cases have allowed re-
covery in such a case.20 The Indiana court, however, disposes of this
argument with but little comment. Logically it should make no difference,
but it may give the courts something to tie to, in case they decide to give
the wife her just relief. C. M.
TORT CLAIMS AS OPERATING EXPENSES GIVEN PRIORITY OVER MORTGAGE
LIENS AS TO EARNINGS OF A STREET RAILWAY COMPANY IN RECEIVER'S
HANDS-Appellants filed claims based on injuries to persons and damages
to property arising out of the operation of the Union Traction Company
prior to the appointment of a receiver. Appellants claimed a right to
preference and priority of payment as a part of the usual, natural and
ordinary operating expense of the railroad, and that the mortgagees took
their mortgages with the understanding that all railroad operating expenses
were to be paid out of current revenues before such mortgages had any
claim upon such revenues. Held, claims against the railway company for
injuries to persons and damages to property before, as well as after,
appointment of receiver therefor are "operating expenses" entitled to
priority over mortgages in payment.1
While there is no precedent in Indiana law for this decision, upon
analysis of other authority and of the principles involved, it seems to be a
desirable result.
That operating expenses constitute a preferred claim on moneys received
from such operation is well settled.2 As to just what claims shall constitute
Holmes v. Holmes (1893), 133 Ind. 386, 32 N. E. 932; Dietyman v. Mullin (1900),
108 Ky. 610, 57 S. W. 247; Smith v. Smith (1897), 98 Tenn. 101, 33 S. W. 439;
Hodgkinson v. Hodgidnson (1895), 43 Neb. 269, 61 N. W. 577.
13These states are Michigan, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island.
See Marri v. Stamford St. R. Co. (1911), 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582; Bolger v. Boston
Elevated Ry. Co. (1910), 205 Mass. 420, 91 N. E. 389; Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods
Co. (1915), 184 Mich. 304, 151 N. W. 724; Golden v. R. L. Green Paper Co. (1922),
44 R. I. 231, 116 Atl. 579.
19Holbrook, The Change In the Meaning of Consortium (1923), 22 Mich. L.
Rev. 1.
z'Flandermeyer v. Cooper (1912), 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N. E. 102; Moberg v.
Scott (1917), 38 S. D. 422, 161 N. W. 998.
'McCullough v. Union Traction Co. of Indiana, Supreme Court of Indiana, 1933,
186 N. E. 300.2 Jones, Mortgages, Sec. 827; Clark v. Central Railroad & Banking Co. of
Georgia (1895), 66 Fed. 803 (C. C. A., 5th) ; Texas & Pacific Railway Company v.
Johnson (1890), 16 Tex. 421, 13 S. W. 463, 18 Am. St. Rep. 60.
